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FREE SPEECH
United States Constitution Amendment I
Congress shall make no law ... respecting the freedom
of speech....
New York Constitution Article I Section 8:
[N]o law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty ofspeech ....
NASSAU COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
People v. Zedner'
(Published August 13, 2002)
Jacob Zedner was arrested and charged with two counts of
aggravated harassment in the second degree, pursuant to New York
Penal Law Section 240.30(1).2 Zedner had made a series of fax
transmissions to the Nassau County Treasurer's office that
involved alleged threats with special reference to the tragic events
September 11, 2001. 3
The basis for the prosecution of this case was a four-page
fax4 sent to John Dominsky, who is the Treasurer and Clerk of the
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 13, 2002, at 25, col. 4 (Nass. County Dist. Ct.).
2 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney 1992) provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second
degree when, with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm
another person, he or she: 1. Either (a) communicates with a
person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, or by
telegraph, mail or any other form of written communication, in
a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; or (b) causes a
communication to be initiated by mechanical or electronic
means or otherwise with a person, anonymously or otherwise,
by telephone, or by telegraph, mail or any other form of
written communication, in a manner likely to cause alarm.
3 Zedner, supra note 1.
4 The fax stated in pertinent parts: "If you and the board of trustee will not obey,
I.T.N.O.T.G.A.O.T.U. chaos will be upon you..."; "I guess New York did not
1
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Village of Great Neck. 5 Mr. Dominsky's supporting deposition
stated that he sent a notice of overdue taxes to Mr. Zedner in
August of 2001 and as a result of that notice, Zedner phoned the
village office and spoke with Dominsky on October 19, 2001.6
The deposition further stated that in Dominsky's opinion Zedner
was "angry, excited and.., in need of [mental] medical
attention." 7  After the conversation, Dominsky's office received
the fax from Zedner.8 In his deposition, Dominsky stated he felt
the fax made references to September 1 1th and the communication
was threatening. 9 Dominsky also feared that Zedner would act on
his threats. 10 As a result of this deposition, Zedner was arrested."
The court was presented with two questions: whether the
evidence established a prima facie case for aggravated harassment
in the second degree; and whether Zedner's statements were
merely expressions of free speech protected under the First 13 and
Fourteenth 14 Amendments of the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Section 815 of the New York State Constitution?
16
Zedner made a motion, pursuant to New York Criminal
Procedure Law Sections 170.30,1V 170.35,18 100.40'9 and 100.1520
learn yet, and did not obey the instructions which, I gave them
I.T.N.O.T.G.A.O.T.U. before"; "if you will not obey I.T.N.O.T.G.A.O.T.U. You
continue to see the punishment of G-D. Pharaoh got 10 punishments and he
didn't listen. I, hope you have greater wisdom."
5 Zedner, supra note 1.
6 Zedner, supra note 1, at col. 5.
7 Zedner, supra note 1, at col. 5.
8 Zedner, supra note 1, at col. 5.
9 Zedner, supra note 1, at col. 5.
1o Zedner, supra note 1, at col. 5.
" Zedner, supra note 1, at col. 4.
12 Zedner, supra note 1, at col. 5.
13 U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech .... "
14 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part: "[N]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law...."
'5 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides in pertinent part: "[IN]o law shall be passed
to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech ......
16 Zedner, supra note 1, at col. 5.
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After arraignment upon an information, a simplified
information, a prosecutor's information or a misdemeanor
complaint, the local criminal court may, upon notice of the
defendant, dismiss such instrument or any count thereof upon
the ground that: (a) It is defective, within the meaning of
170.35.
18 N.Y. CRiM PROC. LAW § 170.35(1) (McKinney 1993) provides in pertinent
part:
An information, a simplified information, a prosecutor's
information or a misdemeanor complaint, or a count thereof, is
defective within the meaning of paragraph (a) of subdivision
one of section 170.30 when: (a) It is not sufficient on its face
pursuant to the requirements of section 100.40; provided that
such an instrument or count may not be dismissed as
defective, but must instead be amended, where the defect or
irregularity is of a kind that may be cured by amendment and
where the people move to so amend; or... (c)The statute
defining the offense charged is unconstitutional or otherwise
invalid.
19 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(1) (McKinney 1992) provides in pertinent
part:
An information, or a count thereof, is sufficient on its face
when: (a) It substantially conforms to the requirements
prescribed in section 100.15; and (b) The allegations of the
factual part of the information, together with those of any
supporting depositions which may accompany it, provide
reasonable cause to believe that defendant committed the
offense charged in the accusatory part of the information; and
(c) Non-hearsay allegations of the factual part of the
information and/or of any supporting depositions establish, if
true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's
commission thereof.
20 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15(3) (McKinney 1992) provides in pertinent
part:
The factual part of such instrument must contain a statement
of the complainant alleging facts of an evidentiary character
supporting or tending to support the charges. Where more
than one offense is charged, the factual part should consist of a
single factual account applicable to all the counts of the
accusatory part. The factual allegations may be based either
upon personal knowledge of the complainant or upon
information and belief. Nothing in this section, however,
limits or affects the requirement, prescribed in subdivision one
of section 100.40, that in order for an information or a count
thereof to be sufficient on its face, every element of the
offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof must
3
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to dismiss two district court informations, 21 claiming that the
22
informations were facially insufficient and defective. The court
stated that the language used by Zedner was "inappropriate, and in
poor judgment" but noted that this alone does not make the
language criminally actionable. 23 The Zedner court dismissed all
the criminal charges filed against Zedner.24 The court ruled that
the conclusion that Zedner's statements referred to September 11th
was "a stretch and nothing but an educated guess to turn some
stupid comment into a criminal event." 25  The court further
explained, "even if this Court were to agree that the comment
made reference to September 11, 2001, this does not constitute a
criminal statement showing that clear and present danger was
imminent to any individual or that exigent circumstances
existed.",26  The court ruled the statements were protected
expressions of free speech and expression under both the New
York Constitution and Federal Constitution.
27
Zedner argued that the alleged statements in the
informations did not constitute an immediate threat and that the
be supported by non-hearsay allegations of such information
and/or any supporting depositions.
21 The first information stated:
TO WIT: At the time and place aforesaid Arrested Jacob
Zedner did send a harassing fax to the Nassau County Tax
Office promising "Chaos upon them... 'and stating "I guess
New York did not learn yet and did not obey the instructions
which I gave them.' Following the fax was a phone call from
the defendant confirming the fax. These actions have put
Comp. Mari Lonino in fear for her safety.
The second information stated:
TO WIT: At the time and place aforesaid Arrestee Jacob
Zedner did send a four page harassing fax to the Treasurer of
the Village of Great Neck personally naming Comp. John
Dominsky by name and stating "I guess New York did not
learn yet and did not obey the instructions which I gave them.'
This has put Comp. John Dominsky in fear for his safety.
22 Zedner, supra note 1, at col. 4.
23 Zedner, supra note 1, at col. 1.
24 Zedner, supra note 1, at col. 1.
25 Zedner, supra note 1, at col. 1.
26 Zedner, supra note 1, at col. 1.
27 Zedner, supra note 1, at col. 1.
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speech was protected under the United States Constitution.28 The
prosecution believed specific areas of the fax were criminal. 29 The
district court agreed with Zedner and dismissed the criminal
charges.30  The court relied on three cases to come to this
conclusion.
The court relied on People v. Dietze,3' which stated that
speech may often be "abusive-even vulgar, derisive, and
provocative-and yet it is still protected under the State and
Federal constitutional Auarantees of free expression unless it is
much more than that." The Dietze court further stated, "unless
speech presents a clear and present danger of some serious
substantive evil, it may neither be forbidden nor penalized. ' 33 In
Dietze, the defendant made statements that she would "beat the
crap out of [complainant] some day or night in the street.",34 The
Dietze court found that there was nothing in the record that proved
that defendant's statement "was either serious, should reasonably
have been taken to be serious, or was confirmed by other words or
acts showing that it was anything more than a crude outburst.
While genuine threats of physical harm fall within the scope of the
statute, such an outburst, without more, does not."
35
The Zedner court also relied on People v. Yablov, 36 in
which the defendant was charged with violating New York Penal
Law Section 240.30(1). 37 The defendant in Yablov had left a series
of allegedly threatening messages on his former lover's answering
28 Zedner, supra note 1, at col. 1.
29 Zedner, supra note 1, at col. 1.
30 Zedner, supra note 1, at col. 1.
3' 75 N.Y.2d 47, 549 N.E.2d 1166, 550 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1989).
31 id. at 51, 549 N.E.2d at 1168, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 597. The court referenced
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133-34 (1974) and Steinhilber v.
Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 501 N.E.2d 550, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1986). Id.
33 Id. see also Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949); City of Houston
v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1987); People v. Feiner, 300 N.Y. 391, 402, 91
N.E.2d .316, 320 (1950), aff-d 340 U.S. 315 (1951).34 Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d at 50, 549 N.E.2d at 1167, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
" Id. at 53-54, 549 N.E.2d at 1169-70, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 598-99; see also Watts
v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969); People v. Todaro, 26 N.Y.2d 325,
258 N.E.2d 711, 310 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1970).
6 183 Misc.2d 880, 706 N.Y.S.2d 591 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2000).
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machine over a period of seventeen months. 38  Three specific
messages were used as the basis of the prosecution. 39 The Yablov
court determined that although annoying, the alleged threats were
protected free speech because in all of the calls no specific threat
of harm was made.4°
The Zedner court felt it necessary to distinguish People v.
Pricea' on its facts.42 In Price, the defendant was charged with
violating three counts of New York Penal Law Section
240.30(1), 43 aggravated harassment in the second degree.44 The
defendant had sent a letter to his attorney, left a message with his
attorney, and stated "I'll get Jyou" while shaking his hand at her
during a court appearance. The Price court held that the
communication through the mail and the phone message were not
constitutionally protected because they specifically targeted the
attorney and invaded her privacy interest.
46
The Federal Constitution provides virtually the same free
speech protection as the New York State Constitution.
Brandenburg v. Ohio exemplifies the federal constitutional
protections afforded free speech.47 In Brandenburg, a Ku Klux
Klan leader was convicted under an Ohio statute for
38 Yablov, 183 Misc.2d at 881, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
39 Id. at 881-83; 706 N.Y.S.2d at 592-93. The three messages were as follows:
If I don't get the money you make tomorrow, I'll go to the next step. I have so
many irons in the fire, you don't know what the fuck is going on! You'll be
vulnerable we'll get you David, we'll get you!"; "Pay me or see me! I laid it
right on the line for you." and "David-David-David-Fuck you David! Are you
there? It's 9 pm Saturday night. Are you out drinking, dancing, carousing?
Fuck you! Fuck you!"
Id.
40 Id. at 886-87, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
41 178 Misc.2d 778, 683 N.Y.S.2d 417 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1998).
42 Zedner, supra note 1.
43 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney 1992); see supra note 2.
44 Price, 183 Misc.2d at 779, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
45 Id. The letter stated "I'm going through all this shit with you, you better be
careful, I won't be responsible if you speak to me like that again."; the phone
message stated "You will be fucking sorry, you're playing with fire, you better
get me my apartment free and clear with no rent for five years, that's the only
way it will be balanced, I' [sic] be at [Ms. Berman's address], no doors will keep
me out, you better perform magic on Thursday."
46 Id. at 781, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
4' 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
278 [Vol 19
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"advocat[ing]... the duty, necessity or propriety of crime,
sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform" and for "voluntarily
assembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons
formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal
syndicalism. ' A8  The conviction arose out of two speeches
Brandenburg made at a Klan meeting that was closed to the public
and attended only by Klan members, a reporter and his
cameraman. 49 Portions of the speeches were aired on local and
national television networks.5 0 During his speeches, Brandenburg
made derogatory statements about African-Americans and Jews,
and also said "if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court,
continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that
there might have to be some revengeance taken."
5'
The Supreme Court struck down the Ohio statute, stating
"that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action."52 The Court held that if a statute
does not properly draw the distinction between generally
advocating violence and advocating groups to imminently commit
violent acts, it is in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
5 3
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court case Watts
v. United States, stressed that speech often is vulgar and nasty, but
this does not make it criminal. 4 In that case, a young black man
named Watts stated in public, "I am not going [to Vietnam]. 55 If
they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my
sights is L.B.J.",5 6  Watts was charged with knowingly and
48 Id. at 444-45.
49 Id. at 445-47.
50 Id. at 445.
I' ld. at 446.52 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
53 Id. at 448.
14 394 U.S. 705, 705 (1969).
55 id.
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willfully threatening the President and was convicted.57 The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the guilty verdict.58
The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction and
remanded to the district court, ordering it to enter a judgment of
acquittal.59  The Court believed that "what is a threat must be
distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech."
60
The Court ruled the government must prove that the speech was
indeed a true threat and they had failed to do so. 61 The Court
believed that Watt's speech was "political hyperbole," and
contained no actual threat to the life of the President.
6 2
In Gooding v. Wilson,63 the United States Supreme Court
decided another case involving the interpretation of abusive
language. In Wilson, the defendant was tried and convicted of
violating Georgia Code Section 26-6303, which criminalized the
use of "opprobrious words" or "abusive language." 64  Wilson
appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court, but his conviction was
upheld.65 Wilson sought and received habeas corpus relief from
the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.66  The
district court held that Section 26-6303 on its face was
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague, in violation of the United
States Constitution.67 The district court overturned the conviction,
57 Id. Watts was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §871(a), a federal statute which
provides in pertinent part: "(a) Whoever ... knowingly and willfully otherwise
makes any such threat against the President, President-elect, Vice President or
other officer next in the order of succession to the office of President, or Vice
President-elect, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both."
58 See Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
59 Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
60 Id. at 707.
61 Id. at 708.
62 Id.
63 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
64 Id.; Ga. Code Ann. § 26-6303 (n.d.) provided in pertinent part: "Any person
who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his
presence... opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach
of the peace.., shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
65 Wilson, 405 U.S. at 518.
66 id.
67 Id. at 520.
[Vol 19280
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the court of appeals affirmed, as did the United States Supreme
Court.68
Wilson, who opposed the Vietnam War, picketed a building
where the United States Army was located. When the police
arrived, Wilson assaulted the officers while yelling at them. 7' The
Supreme Court held that Wilson was fairly convicted of assault
and battery and dealt only with the constitutionality of Section 26-
6303. 7 1 The Court stated that Section 26-6303 dealt only with
spoken words, and therefore it must not run contrary to speech
protected by the United States Constitution.72 The Court ruled that
a state law must be specifically and narrowly drawn as to only
outlaw speech that contained specific threats or fighting words.
The Court determined that the terms "opprobrious" and "abusive"
had a greater reach than "fighting" words, making the Georgia
statute overbroad and vague, and as a result unconstitutional.
74
In conclusion, the Federal Constitution and the New York
State Constitution are quite similar with respect to the free speech
protections afforded to citizens. New York holds that speech
contains fighting words or specific threats are not constitutionally
protected. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court holds the
same, as demonstrated in Wilson, and continues to apply this




70 Wilson, 405 U.S. at 520 n.2. Appellee said, "White son of a bitch, I'll kill
you."; "You son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death."; "You son of a bitch, if you
ever put your hands on me again, I'll cut you all to pieces." Id.
71 Id. at 520 n. 1.
72 Id. at 520.
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